DiscussionThe Economics of Network-Based Deposit Insurance

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Yale and NBER

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- ► Capped coverage: since 2010, \$250,000 per "depositor-bank-category"
 - ▶ Depositors → incentives to spread deposits across banks
 - ► Since 2003: *IntraFi Network* → reciprocal deposits
 - ► Since 2018: preferential regulatory treatment

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 - ▶ Depositors → incentives to spread deposits across banks
 - ► Since 2003: *IntraFi Network* → reciprocal deposits
 - ► Since 2018: preferential regulatory treatment
- ► This paper:

What is the impact of the rise of reciprocal deposits?

- Descriptive results
 - 1. Significant growth, mostly after 2018 (regulation) and 2023 (crisis)
 - 2. Network banks: growth from small/midsize banks
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 - 1. Network banks attract insured (and overall) deposits in 2023 crisis
 - 2. Network banks manage to offer lower CD rates
 - 3. Refined estimates using switcher banks
- Valuable contribution
- ▶ In 2023, I discussed Pancost and Robatto (2024) (link) and wrote

"Virtually no work on deposit spreading"

Outline

- 1. FDIC Limits
- 2. Brokered vs. Reciprocal Deposits
- 3. Revisit Results
- 4. Questions and Broader Implications
 - Reciprocal Deposits
 - Deposit Insurance Design

How Do FDIC Limits Work?

- ► Coverage limit per i) depositor, ii) bank, and iii) category
 - ▶ Not per account!
 - e.g. 2 individual accounts at same bank \Rightarrow coverage still \$250,000
 - e.g. 1 individual and 1 joint account \Rightarrow coverage \$500,000

How Do FDIC Limits Work?

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- There are 12 ownership categories
 - Single accounts 12 C.F.R. § 330.6
 - Certain retirement accounts 12 C.F.R. § 330.14(b)(2)
 - Joint accounts <u>12 C.F.R. § 330.9</u> **∠**
 - Trust accounts <u>12 C.F.R. § 330.10</u> **∠**
 - Employee benefit plan accounts 12 C.F.R. § 330.14
 - Business/Organization accounts 12 C.F.R. § 330.11

 ✓
 - Government accounts (public unit accounts) 12 C.F.R. § 330.15

 ✓
 - Mortgage servicing accounts for principal and interest payments 12 C.F.R. § 330.7(d)
 - Accounts held by a depository institution as the trustee of an irrevocable trust 12 C.F.R. § 330.12 🗹
 - Annuity contract accounts 12 C.F.R. § 330.8
 - Public bond accounts 12 C.F.R. § 330.15(c)

 ✓
 - Custodian accounts for Native Americans 12 C.F.R. § 330.7(e)

Deposit Spreading

► Incentive for depositors to spread deposits













Bucks star Giannis Antetokounmpo has money in 50 different bank accounts

By Ariel Zilber Published April 8, 2022, 2:39 p.m. ET

Giannis Antetokounmpo, the two-time MVP who last year led the Milwaukee Bucks to their first NBA title since 1971. opened bank accounts with 50 different banks — each one of them holding \$250,000, his boss, team owner Marc Lasry, told Bloomberg News.

Brokered vs. Reciprocal Deposits

- 1. *Brokered Deposits*: funds placed in a bank by/through "deposit broker" brokerage firm, advisor, fintech app, etc.
 - ▶ Volatile funding source \rightarrow since 1980's, regulated 1991
 - Regulatory restrictions: only well-capitalized banks

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 - Regulatory restrictions: only well-capitalized banks
- 2. Reciprocal Deposits: customer places funds at home bank, which uses deposit network (IntraFi) to spread funds among other banks while receiving an equal amount back
 - ▶ More stable funding source \rightarrow since 2003
 - ≥ 2018 → regulatory change (EGRRCPA)
 - ▶ before → classified as brokered
 - ▶ after \rightarrow not brokered (some restrictions, e.g. < 20% of total deposits)

IntraFi

How Does IntraFi Work?

IntraFi Network Deposits (previously known as CDARS or ICS) is a network that links many of the largest banks and financial institutions in a shared network. If you have more than \$250,000 in savings accounts or certificates of deposit in an investment plan, you might want to consider using the IntraFi network. It can help you bank your money while maintaining FDIC insurance.

You create an account with one custodial bank in the network. Think of that bank as managing your relationship with others, because they spread your total deposit amount out over multiple different financial institutions.


Your funds are split up into multiple accounts of \$250,000 or less, each fully FDIC-insured, at various institutions, with IntraFi Network acting as your hub. This can be a valuable solution for <u>high net-worth individuals</u> as well as businesses.

- Virtually all reciprocal deposits are from IntraFi owned by Blackstone and Warburg Pincus
 - "The Economics of IntraFi"
 - Strong network effects → natural to have a single system

Data

- ► Call Reports: 2011Q1 to 2024Q3, quarterly data
- ► RateWatch 12-month CD rates

Participating Banks




▶ 2018: regulatory change

▶ 2023: SVB crisis

Share of Reciprocal Deposits


(b) Reciprocal Deposits to Total Deposits



► Small: < \$10b; Midsize > \$10b but < \$100b


Behavior of Insured Deposits

(a) Insured Deposits



▶ Differential insured deposit growth of network banks in 2023

Failure Prevention in 2023 Crisis




- ► Case study → Reciprocal deposits help to prevent failures
 - 1. Pacific Western and Western Alliance: use reciprocal deposits
 - 2. Silicon Valley, First Republic, Signature: didn't

Other Results

- 1. Estimate of supply elasticity to interest rates
 - Increase in deposit quantity and reduction in interest rates
 - Driven by demand shift
- Identification via switchers: "these banks joined primarily due to reduced regulatory costs and not other factors such as hidden risk characteristics or depositor base"
 - Identification is hard
- ► More granular data would be ideal
 - e.g. compare rates for reciprocal deposits vs. not
 - ightharpoonup Depositors can exclude banks ightharpoonup monitoring

Who Uses Reciprocal Deposits?



ightharpoonup > 85% businesses + public entities + non-profits

 What limits deposit spread 	ing?
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 - Not obvious market structure implications

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- Somewhat arbitrary
- Are brokered deposits really more flighty?

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3. Level of coverage vs. form of coverage?

- ► How much to cover? → Dávila and Goldstein (2023)
- ▶ Best way to do that? \rightarrow ?

Conclusion

- ▶ Valuable evidence on deposit spreading ← understudied!
- Useful analysis given available data
- ► More refined data could help
 - Interest rates
 - Depositor behavior
 - Market structure
- Scope to do more work on deposit insurance!

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Thank you for your attention!

References I

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