

Discussion
The Macroeconomics of Trade Credit
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Yale and NBER

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 - ▶ Focused on financial institutions/banks
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- ▶ Key insights
 1. Trade credit increases output and bank credit (*trade credit multiplier*)
 2. It can *dampen* or *amplify* financial shocks

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
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 1. Trade credit increases output and bank credit (*trade credit multiplier*)
 2. It can *dampen* or *amplify* financial shocks
- ▶ Elegant framework + Careful quantification

Outline of Discussion

1. Revisit model
2. Summarize main insights
3. Comments/Remarks


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- ▶ **Final good producers:** use N_i intermediates and capital (competitive)
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- ▶ **Banks:** extend credit to both producers

Model

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 - ▶ Quantity of intermediate $x_{ij,t}$
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- ▶ **Remark #1:** full bargaining power to int. good producer
 - ▶ p 's are *payments* not prices
- ▶ **Remark #2:** related to *working capital* channel
 - ▶ Difference is that trade credit comes from supplier

Financial Frictions

- ▶ Borrowing from banks:

$$b_{ij,t} \leq \underbrace{(1 - \theta_t)}_{\text{enforceable}} \underbrace{[1 - \delta(1 - \pi_i)]}_{\text{afternoon}} \underbrace{p_{i,t} y_{i,t}}_{\text{revenue}} \quad \text{and} \quad b_{ij,t}^x \leq \underbrace{(1 - \theta_t)}_{\text{enforceable}} \underbrace{p_{ij,t}^{\text{tc}}}_{\text{trade credit}}$$

- ▶ Trade credit:

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
- ▶ Financial shock: θ_t is random \Rightarrow Only shock of the model
High $\theta \Rightarrow$ worse financial frictions

Key Insight #1: Output

► Spot vs. trade credit economies

1. Trade credit economy features higher output than spot economy
 - Can reach first best (if financial frictions are mild enough)
2. Trade credit economy sustains more bank credit than spot economy
 - Credit multiplier: trade credit can be (partially) pledged with banks

Liquidity multiplier (similar to HT97)



Key Insight #2: Amplification vs. Dampening

- ▶ When financial frictions are mild (θ is low)
 - ▶ Trade credit will dampen financial shock (perfect smoothing)
 - ▶ Bank and trade credit are substitutes
- ▶ When financial frictions are tight (θ is high)
 - ▶ Trade credit amplifies output drop
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- ▶ Quantitative analysis in calibrated model (Italian firms)
 - ▶ Trade credit supports **14%** more output
 - ▶ Trade credit responsible for **45%** of Great Recession output drop

Large because many firms are constrained

Comments/Remarks/Questions

1. **Maturity of trade credit**

- ▶ Most trade credit is typically 30/60 days
- ▶ Bank credit is typically of longer term
 - ▶ Collateralized vs. uncollateralized
- ▶ Do these forms of credit interact (as complements/substitutes) with each other?
- ▶ How important overall is credit <30 days?

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2. Impact of other (non-financial) shocks

- ▶ The paper exclusively consider “financial shocks”, modeled in the form of a tightening of bank borrowing conditions
 - ▶ Change in θ
- ▶ One would expect *real shocks* to be dampened in economies in which trade credit is feasible
- ▶ Can the paper explore shocks centered around trade credit?

Comments/Remarks/Questions

3. Normative insights

- ▶ The paper has a Section 4.4 on corporate subsidies
- ▶ I would love to see more on the normative side!
- ▶ This economy features efficiency losses coming from
 - ▶ Aggregate factor use (labor wedges)
 - ▶ Cross-sectional intermediate input use
- ▶ It would be useful to formally decompose these channels
Welfare accounting (Davila/Schaab 2023)

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4. Richer production and financial network structures

- ▶ Paper assumes particular production structure
 - ▶ One layer of pure intermediates
- ▶ Structure of production/financial networks has to matter

Comments/Remarks/Questions

5. **Relevance of liquidity multiplier**

- ▶ How large is the multiplier effect of trade credit?
- ▶ As the paper argues, trade credit is quite junior (hard to pledge)
- ▶ More evidence useful here

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6. Difference between intermediate inputs and factors

- ▶ We all offer trade credit to our employers (i.e. get paid at end of month, week, ...)
- ▶ Is there anything special about intermediate inputs?
 - ▶ Could we write the model with just one layer: trade credit from factor/labor suppliers?

Conclusion

- ▶ Very nice paper on the role trade credit with financial frictions
- ▶ Valuable conceptual insights and careful quantification
- ▶ Still room to do more!