Discussion Valuing Financial Data by Maryam Farboodi, Dhruv Singal, Laura Veldkamp, and Venky Venkateswaran

Eduardo Dávila

Yale and NBER

SFS Cavalcade, Austin May 24, 2023

Fundamental question: How much is an investor willing to pay for some data? data=information

Fundamental question:

How much is an investor willing to pay for some data? data=information

This paper:

1. Theoretical framework to answer this question Sufficient statistics

Fundamental question:

How much is an investor willing to pay for some data? data=information

This paper:

1. Theoretical framework to answer this question Sufficient statistics

2. Measurement exercises

Emphasis on role of wealth and risk aversion

- Value of median analyst forecasts
- Value of realized GDP

Fundamental question:

How much is an investor willing to pay for some data? data=information

This paper:

1. Theoretical framework to answer this question Sufficient statistics

2. Measurement exercises

Emphasis on role of wealth and risk aversion

- Value of median analyst forecasts
- Value of realized GDP
- ► Underexplored topic ⇒ Very important exercise

Outline of Discussion

- 1. Theoretical Framework
- 2. Measurement
- 3. Comments/Remarks/Questions

Framework

► Standard OLG-AR(1)-REE model with *N* assets

Competitive and strategic

Framework

► Standard OLG-AR(1)-REE model with *N* assets

Competitive and strategic

Second-order approximation to utility (critical)

$$\mathbb{E}\left[U\left(c_{it+1}\right)|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right] = \rho_i \mathbb{E}\left[c_{it+1}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right] - \frac{\rho_i^2}{2} \mathbb{V}\left[c_{it+1}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]$$

• Absolute RA:
$$\rho_i = -\frac{U''}{U'}$$
, so $\rho_i = \frac{RRA}{w_{it}}$

Framework

Standard OLG-AR(1)-REE model with N assets

Competitive and strategic

Second-order approximation to utility (critical)

$$\mathbb{E}\left[U\left(c_{it+1}\right)|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right] = \rho_{i}\mathbb{E}\left[c_{it+1}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right] - \frac{\rho_{i}^{2}}{2}\mathbb{V}\left[c_{it+1}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]$$

• Absolute RA: $\rho_i = -\frac{U''}{U'}$, so $\rho_i = \frac{RRA}{w_{it}}$

Standard REE with information set: $\mathcal{I}_{it} = \{\mathcal{I}_t^-, s_{it}, p_t\}$

Key Result

Lemma 1: (competitive case)

$$\underbrace{\mathbb{E}\left[U\left(c_{it+1}\right)|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]}_{=\tilde{U}(\mathcal{I}_{it})} = \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{it}\right]' \mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{it}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]^{-1}\mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{it}\right] \\ + \frac{1}{2}Tr\left[\mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{it}\right]^{-1}\mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{it}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]^{-1} - I\right] + r\rho_{i}\overline{w}_{it}$$

$$\blacktriangleright \text{ "Excess payoff": } \Pi_{it} = \theta_{i}\left[p_{t+1} + d_{t+1} - rp_{t}\right]$$

5/10

Key Result

Lemma 1: (competitive case)

$$\underbrace{\mathbb{E}\left[U\left(c_{it+1}\right)|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]}_{=\tilde{U}(\mathcal{I}_{it})} = \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{it}\right]' \mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{it}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]^{-1}\mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{it}\right] + \frac{1}{2}Tr\left[\mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{it}\right]^{-1} \mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{it}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]^{-1} - I\right] + r\rho_{i}\overline{w}_{it}$$

• "Excess payoff": $\Pi_{it} = \theta_i \left[p_{t+1} + d_{t+1} - r p_t \right]$

Value of data =
$$\frac{1}{\rho_i} \left(\tilde{U} \left(\mathcal{I}_{it} + \text{data} \right) - \tilde{U} \left(\mathcal{I}_{it} \right) \right)$$

Key Result

Lemma 1: (competitive case)

$$\underbrace{\mathbb{E}\left[U\left(c_{it+1}\right)|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]}_{=\tilde{U}(\mathcal{I}_{it})} = \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{it}\right]' \mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{it}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]^{-1}\mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{it}\right] + \frac{1}{2}Tr\left[\mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{it}\right]^{-1}\mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{it}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]^{-1} - I\right] + r\rho_{i}\overline{w}_{it}$$

• "Excess payoff": $\Pi_{it} = \theta_i \left[p_{t+1} + d_{t+1} - rp_t \right]$

Value of data =
$$\frac{1}{\rho_i} \left(\tilde{U} \left(\mathcal{I}_{it} + \text{data} \right) - \tilde{U} \left(\mathcal{I}_{it} \right) \right)$$

Remarks

- 1. Sufficient statistics: $\mathbb{E}[\Pi_{it}], \mathbb{V}[\Pi_{it}], \mathbb{V}[\Pi_{it}]^{-1}$ (and ρ_i)
- 2. Note that ρ_i is key for magnitudes high wealth \Rightarrow high value; given RRA
- 3. Money-metric (in \$) \Rightarrow Linear-quadratic is quasilinear
- Paper also allows for price impact high price impact ⇒ less value of information

Measurement

Switch to returns for measurement: $\Pi_{it} \Rightarrow R_t$

$$\begin{split} R_t &= \overbrace{\beta_1 X_t}^{\text{data}} + \overbrace{\beta_2 Z_t}^{\text{existing info.}} + \varepsilon_t^{XZ} \\ R_t &= \underbrace{\gamma_2 Z_t}_{\text{existing info.}} + \varepsilon_t^Z \end{split}$$

Measurement

- Switch to returns for measurement: $\Pi_{it} \Rightarrow R_t$
 - E [Π_{it}] and V [Π_{it}] estimated via unconditional moments

 V [Π_{it}|*I*_{it}]⁻¹ estimated via



- Exercise #1: X_t is I/B/E/S forecasts
 - Variation in wealth, investment styles, existing data, etc.
 - Headline willingness-to-pay:
 - ► For \$500k investor: ~\$3,000
 - ► For \$250m investor: ~\$1m
- Exercise #2: realized GDP

1. Why is information valuable?

- Can investors trade more/better?
- Is it because of preferences for early resolution of uncertainty?

Implied by linear-quadratic preferences

- Can underlying sources of value be decomposed?
- No role for production

- 2. Why do we need the equilibrium structure?
 - Lemma 3 in Appendix:

$$\underbrace{\mathbb{E}\left[U\left(c_{it+1}\right)|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]}_{=\tilde{U}(\mathcal{I}_{it})} = \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{it}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]' \mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{it}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right]^{-1}\mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{it}|\mathcal{I}_{it}\right] + r\rho_{i}\overline{w}_{it}$$

- This expression requires fewer assumptions than Lemma 1
- Why not using $\mathbb{E}[\Pi_{it}|\mathcal{I}_{it}]'$ and $\mathbb{V}[\Pi_{it}|\hat{\mathcal{I}}_{it}]$ as sufficient statistics?
- Small aside: finance/asset pricing "invented" sufficient statistics!
 - CAPM, SDF, etc.
 - Makes sense to use this approach!

- 3. How does the "big *K*, little *k*" issue with information manifests here?
 - The value of data for one investor depends on the information of others and how they respond:

$$V_i\left(\mathcal{I}_i; \{\mathcal{I}_j\}_{j\in I}\right)$$

How can we see this in the measurement?

- Can we decompose the value holding fixed behavioral responses and then reacting?
- Can we compute the willingness to pay of one investor if everyone gets the information?
- Easy to compute these counterfactuals in the model (connects to comment #1)
 - Sufficient statistics as intermediate objects for modeling

- 3. How does the "big *K*, little *k*" issue with information manifests here?
 - The value of data for one investor depends on the information of others and how they respond:

$$V_i\left(\mathcal{I}_i; \{\mathcal{I}_j\}_{j\in I}\right)$$

How can we see this in the measurement?

- Can we decompose the value holding fixed behavioral responses and then reacting?
- Can we compute the willingness to pay of one investor if everyone gets the information?
- Easy to compute these counterfactuals in the model (connects to comment #1)
 - Sufficient statistics as intermediate objects for modeling

4. Distinction between private and social value?

Welfare question remains open

Conclusion

Important question

- I'm very supportive of the overall approach
- Nice way to connect theory and measurement

Conclusion

Important question

- I'm very supportive of the overall approach
- Nice way to connect theory and measurement
- There is scope to dig deeper into the sources of value...
- ... while qualifying the role of some of the assumptions
- ▶ I conjecture much work will follow