# Discussion <br> Valuing Financial Data <br> by Maryam Farboodi, Dhruv Singal, Laura Veldkamp, and Venky Venkateswaran 

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How much is an investor willing to pay for some data?
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Emphasis on role of wealth and risk aversion

- Value of median analyst forecasts
- Value of realized GDP


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Emphasis on role of wealth and risk aversion

- Value of median analyst forecasts
- Value of realized GDP
- Underexplored topic $\Rightarrow$ Very important exercise


## Outline of Discussion

1. Theoretical Framework
2. Measurement
3. Comments/Remarks/Questions

## Framework

- Standard OLG-AR(1)-REE model with $N$ assets
- Competitive and strategic


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- Competitive and strategic
- Second-order approximation to utility (critical)

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\mathbb{E}\left[U\left(c_{i t+1}\right) \mid \mathcal{I}_{i t}\right]=\rho_{i} \mathbb{E}\left[c_{i t+1} \mid \mathcal{I}_{i t}\right]-\frac{\rho_{i}^{2}}{2} \mathbb{V}\left[c_{i t+1} \mid \mathcal{I}_{i t}\right]
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- Absolute RA: $\rho_{i}=-\frac{U^{\prime \prime}}{U^{\prime}}$, so $\rho_{i}=\frac{R R A}{w_{i t}}$


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- Absolute RA: $\rho_{i}=-\frac{U^{\prime \prime}}{U^{\prime}}$, so $\rho_{i}=\frac{R R A}{w_{i t}}$
- Standard REE with information set: $\mathcal{I}_{i t}=\left\{\mathcal{I}_{t}^{-}, s_{i t}, p_{t}\right\}$


## Key Result

- Lemma 1: (competitive case)

$$
\begin{aligned}
\underbrace{\mathbb{E}\left[U\left(c_{i t+1}\right) \mid \mathcal{I}_{i t}\right]}_{=\tilde{U}\left(\mathcal{I}_{i t}\right)} & =\frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{i t}\right]^{\prime} \mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{i t} \mid \mathcal{I}_{i t}\right]^{-1} \mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{i t}\right] \\
& +\frac{1}{2} \operatorname{Tr}\left[\mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{i t}\right]^{-1} \mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{i t} \mid \mathcal{I}_{i t}\right]^{-1}-I\right]+r \rho_{i} \bar{w}_{i t}
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- "Excess payoff": $\Pi_{i t}=\theta_{i}\left[p_{t+1}+d_{t+1}-r p_{t}\right]$


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- Remarks

1. Sufficient statistics: $\mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{i t}\right], \mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{i t}\right], \mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{i t} \mid \mathcal{I}_{i t}\right]^{-1}$ (and $\rho_{i}$ )
2. Note that $\rho_{i}$ is key for magnitudes high wealth $\Rightarrow$ high value; given RRA
3. Money-metric (in $\$$ ) $\Rightarrow$ Linear-quadratic is quasilinear
4. Paper also allows for price impact
high price impact $\Rightarrow$ less value of information

## Measurement

- Switch to returns for measurement: $\Pi_{i t} \Rightarrow R_{t}$
- $\mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{i t}\right]$ and $\mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{i t}\right]$ estimated via unconditional moments
- $\mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{i t} \mid \mathcal{I}_{i t}\right]^{-1}$ estimated via

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\begin{aligned}
& R_{t}=\overbrace{\beta_{1} X_{t}}^{\text {data }}+\overbrace{\beta_{2} Z_{t}}^{\text {existing info. }}+\varepsilon_{t}^{X Z} \\
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- Exercise \#1: $X_{t}$ is I/B/E/S forecasts
- Variation in wealth, investment styles, existing data, etc.
- Headline willingness-to-pay:
- For \$500k investor: ~\$3,000
- For $\$ 250 \mathrm{~m}$ investor: $\sim \$ 1 \mathrm{~m}$
- Exercise \#2: realized GDP


## Comments/Remarks/Questions

1. Why is information valuable?

- Can investors trade more/better?
- Is it because of preferences for early resolution of uncertainty?
Implied by linear-quadratic preferences
- Can underlying sources of value be decomposed?
- No role for production


## Comments/Remarks/Questions

2. Why do we need the equilibrium structure?

- Lemma 3 in Appendix:

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- This expression requires fewer assumptions than Lemma 1
- Why not using $\mathbb{E}\left[\Pi_{i t} \mid \mathcal{I}_{i t}\right]^{\prime}$ and $\mathbb{V}\left[\Pi_{i t} \mid \mathcal{I}_{i t}\right]$ as sufficient statistics?
- Small aside: finance/asset pricing "invented" sufficient statistics!
- CAPM, SDF, etc.
- Makes sense to use this approach!


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3. How does the "big $K$, little $k$ " issue with information manifests here?

- The value of data for one investor depends on the information of others and how they respond:

$$
V_{i}\left(\mathcal{I}_{i} ;\left\{\mathcal{I}_{j}\right\}_{j \in I}\right)
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- How can we see this in the measurement?
- Can we decompose the value holding fixed behavioral responses and then reacting?
- Can we compute the willingness to pay of one investor if everyone gets the information?
- Easy to compute these counterfactuals in the model (connects to comment \#1)
- Sufficient statistics as intermediate objects for modeling


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4. Distinction between private and social value?

- Welfare question remains open


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- Important question
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- Nice way to connect theory and measurement
- There is scope to dig deeper into the sources of value...
- ... while qualifying the role of some of the assumptions
- I conjecture much work will follow

